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Essays on the Labor Market Effects 
of Place-Based Policies
Jesse McCune Gregory
This thesis consists of three chapters, two of which study 
the impacts of spatially targeted government subsidies on 
individuals’ residential location choices and on local labor 
market outcomes. The first chapter studies the effects of 
disaster-relief programs on the rebuilding and resettlement 
choices of New Orleans homeowners following Hurricane 
Katrina. The second chapter studies the incidence and effi-
ciency of round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone 
program, a set of subsidies targeted to businesses operating 
in six chronically poor neighborhoods in large U.S. cities 
beginning in the early 1990s. The third chapter develops and 
estimates a model of college basketball teams’ optimal strate-
gies across game states and uses the model to reassess the 
findings of a highly visible study in forensic economics that 
interpreted skewness in the distribution of favorites’ winning 
margins as evidence of pervasive illegal point shaving.
Chapter 1
The Impact of Rebuilding Grants and Wage 
Subsidies on the Resettlement Choices of 
Hurricane Katrina Victims
The first chapter studies the effects of disaster-relief 
programs on the rebuilding and resettlement choices of New 
Orleans homeowners following Hurricane Katrina. As with 
other social insurance programs, policymakers designing 
disaster relief packages face a trade-off between effective-
ness and efficiency. The desire to assist disaster victims must 
be weighed against the fear that subsidizing people to live 
in dangerous areas will generate moral hazard with regard 
to location decisions. The size of the economic distortion 
caused by this type of moral hazard depends on the extent 
to which individuals’ and households’ location choices are 
influenced by financial incentives. If each household is 
nearly indifferent between many different residence loca-
tions, then disaster policies that subsidize residence in a 
particular location will generate large distortions. If most 
households strictly prefer one location, then it is possible for 
disaster relief programs to increase the welfare of residents 
in disaster-affected areas without generating large distor-
tions. A full appraisal of the impact of disaster-relief policy 
on social welfare must consider the direct impact of disaster 
relief on victims’ welfare in the aftermath of disasters and the 
extent to which the expectation of future postdisaster bailouts 
distorts location decisions.
The largest post–Hurricane Katrina government trans-
fer to Louisiana homeowners occurred through a federally 
funded and state-administered grant program known as the 
Louisiana Road Home. The Road Home program addressed 
two policy objectives. First, the program compensated 
homeowners for their losses; it made grant payments both 
to homeowners who chose to rebuild and to homeowners 
who chose to relocate. Second, the program encouraged 
households to rebuild by providing more generous net grant 
packages to those who rebuilt than to those who relocated. 
Households who agreed to rebuild received a grant equal to 
the difference between rebuilding costs and payments from 
existing insurance arrangements, while households who 
chose to relocate received a less generous net compensa-
tion package. The program rolled out slowly, with about 
half of the grants dispersed two years or more after Katrina. 
However, the program eventually dispersed about $10 billion 
in grant payments to Louisiana homeowners, making the 
Louisiana Road Home the largest housing recovery program 
in U.S. history.
To assess the impact of the Road Home program, I 
develop and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of 
New Orleans homeowners’ post–Hurricane Katrina resettle-
ment choices. In the model, households make choices regard-
ing residential locations, home repairs, home sales, and 
amounts to borrow or save. The model’s parameters describe 
households’ preferences over consumption and residence 
locations, and describe households’ ability to borrow. The 
model is identified by variation across households in the 
financial incentive to rebuild provided by the Louisiana Road 
Home program and by variation in the relative labor wages 
available in New Orleans versus away from New Orleans for 
workers in different occupations. I use the estimated model 
to measure the impact of post-Katrina relief programs on 
households’ short-term resettlement choices and to quantify 
a key component of the deadweight loss associated with a 
guarantee of future relief.
In order to estimate the model, I create a unique data set 
that combines information from the recently fielded Dis-
placed New Orleans Residents Survey with administrative 
records from the Orleans Parish property database. The Dis-
placed New Orleans Residents Survey (RAND 2010) inter-
viewed a representative sample of pre-Katrina New Orleans 
residents about four years after Katrina regardless of the 
respondents’ locations at the time of the interview. The inter-
views collected information about respondents’ demographic 
background traits, storm-related home damage, insurance 
coverage, and migration choices. The administrative property 
records contribute data describing any post-Katrina home 
sales and a sequence of annual property appraisals that I use 
to construct measures of the timing of home repairs.
In addition to yielding substantive results, the paper 
makes several methodological contributions. The estimated 
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model is the first dynamic structural model of migration to 
formally include asset accumulation choices and the pos-
sibility of borrowing constraints, an important extension to 
recent structural migration models in the literature (see, for 
example, Kennan and Walker [2011]). Borrowing constraints 
will affect the migration choices of any population that faces 
large up-front costs to moving. In the disaster context, those 
costs reflect the price of home repairs. The model would 
be equally well-suited to investigate migration choices, for 
example, among homeowners with negative mortgage equity, 
or other populations that face up-front costs to moving.
This paper also contributes to the structural migration 
literature by estimating a dynamic structural migration model 
using directly observable sources of variation in location-
specific financial incentives. Other studies in this literature 
have relied heavily on variation in the individual-location 
match component of workers’ wages, which must be inferred 
statistically from panel wage data, to identify the influence 
of earnings opportunities on migration. Because I replicate 
several key findings of the existing literature using a differ-
ent and more transparent source of identification, my study 
provides an out-of-sample validation for the main conclu-
sions of the existing literature.
The estimated model finds that households in this popula-
tion have a strong preference for living in New Orleans on 
average, and large population subgroups face borrowing 
constraints. Simulations using the estimated model find that 
the Louisiana Road Home program increased the fraction of 
homes rebuilt during the first four years following Katrina by 
11 percent. This impact occurred primarily by relaxing bor-
rowing constraints for households that would have strongly 
preferred to rebuild even in the absence of the subsidy if the 
associated costs could have been smoothed. The strength 
of households’ location attachments and the prevalence of 
financing frictions suggest that effectively administered 
disaster relief programs have the potential to substantially 
increase social welfare.
Further, the model finds that the deadweight loss associ-
ated with disaster-related location subsidies is smaller than 
one might anticipate. This result is driven by the estimated 
model’s finding that there is substantial heterogeneity in 
the strength of preferences for living in New Orleans. Most 
households are far from the margin with respect to their 
preferred location, and as a consequence, a location subsidy 
induces only a small number of households to change their 
location choices. Simulations find that a guarantee of relief 
in the event of a future disaster generates a deadweight loss 
that is at most 3 percent of the policy’s expected cost. This 
finding suggests that the efficiency loss from disaster-related 
subsidies is substantially smaller than would be predicted 
by a model in which agents share homogeneous location 
preferences.
Chapter 2
The Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent 
Place-Based Policy
The second chapter, written jointly with Matias Busso and 
Patrick Kline, studies the incidence and efficiency of round I 
of the federal urban Empowerment Zone program (EZ). The 
EZ program is one of the largest programs in a growing class 
of policies that targets transfers toward particular geographic 
areas rather than groups of individuals.
Round I EZ designation was awarded to areas in Atlanta, 
Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia. 
Prior to designation, each EZ was characterized by chroni-
cally high rates of poverty and local unemployment. Begin-
ning in 1994, firms operating in EZs became eligible for a 
credit of up to 20 percent of the first $15,000 in wages earned 
in that year by each employee who lived and worked in the 
EZ. These tax credits were available to a business for as long 
as 10 years, with the maximum annual credit per employee 
declining over time. For reference, the average EZ worker 
only earned about $16,000 in wage and salary income in 
1990, so this subsidy comprised a substantial portion of the 
wages of local workers. Each EZ also became eligible for 
$100 million in Social Services Block Grant funds, which 
could be used for such purposes as business assistance, 
infrastructure investment, physical development, training 
programs, youth services, promotion of home ownership, and 
emergency housing assistance.
Economists have traditionally expressed little support for 
spatial subsidies of this sort, fearing that they will gener-
ate large distortions in economic behavior. Indeed, standard 
models of spatial equilibrium suggest mobile workers and 
firms will arbitrage the benefits associated with local policies 
by relocating across the boundaries of targeted areas. Local 
land prices ought then to rise and offset any welfare gains 
that might otherwise accrue to prior residents.
Our evaluation of the EZ program critically examines 
this conjecture. We first develop a tractable spatial equi-
librium model of EZs with landlords, firms, and mobile 
workers who make labor supply and commuting decisions. 
The incidence and efficiency of local subsidies are shown to 
depend critically upon the distribution of agents’ preferences 
over residential and commuting options. If most agents are 
inframarginal in their commuting and residential decisions, 
deadweight loss will be small and local workers will reap the 
benefits of place-based interventions. If, on the other hand, 
agents have nearly identical preferences, as in the classic 
models of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), deadweight 
loss will be substantial and government expenditures will be 
capitalized into land rents. Using arguments similar to Chetty 
(2009), we show that our model allows for simple approxi-
mations to the incidence and deadweight loss of EZs via a 
set of reduced-form elasticities quantifying the program’s 
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impact on the wages of local zone workers and commuters, 
the rental rate of zone housing, and the number of zone jobs 
for local residents and commuters.
Our empirical work centers on estimating these impacts 
using confidential microdata from the decennial census and 
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). These data pro-
vide us with two independent sources of information on local 
employment and allow us to adjust for changes over time in 
the composition of workers and firms. Crucial to our analy-
sis, the Journey to Work component of the census microdata 
allows us to separate the impacts of EZ designation on zone 
workers and zone residents. Because EZs usually constitute 
a small fraction of a city’s area, zone residents who work 
typically do so outside of the zone. Likewise, most zone 
workers are commuters who live outside the zone. Empower-
ment Zones subsidize the employment of workers who live 
and work in the zone, and involve block grants, which may 
indirectly subsidize commuters. This makes it critical for us 
to be able to distinguish between these populations across the 
period of our study—an infeasible task given publicly avail-
able data sources.
To identify the causal impacts of EZ designation, we 
construct a set of control zones based upon previously 
confidential data obtained from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development on the census tract composition of 
rejected and later round EZs. Since these tracts were nomi-
nated for designation by their local governments, they are 
likely to share unobserved traits and trends in common with 
first-round EZs, which also underwent a local nomination 
phase. We demonstrate that, after some basic adjustments, 
the pretreatment levels and trends in these controls closely 
mirror those of the EZs. Having demonstrated suitable bal-
ance, we assess causal impacts of the EZ program using an 
adjusted difference-in-differences estimator.
Our analysis finds that EZ designation resulted in substan-
tial increases in zone employment, along with increases in the 
wages of zone residents working in the zone. These changes 
in the zone labor market appear not to have been accompa-
nied by dramatic changes in the local cost of living. Popula-
tion and housing rents remained roughly constant (though 
evidence on the rental rates of new arrivals to the neighbor-
hood suggests that rents may eventually rise). These results 
suggest that in this context, location and commuting prefer-
ences are sufficiently heterogeneous within the local popula-
tion that EZs’ spatial subsidies accrued to a large extent to 
local workers with a comparatively small efficiency cost.
Chapter 3
Do Basketball Scoring Patterns Reflect 
Widespread Illegal Point Shaving?
The third chapter develops and estimates a model of 
college basketball teams’ optimal strategies across game 
states and uses the model to reassess conclusions of previous 
research (Wolfers 2006) that characterizes right-skewness in 
the distribution of favorites’ winning margins as evidence of 
pervasive illegal point shaving. Wolfers (2006) applies a test 
for point shaving that is based on a noneconomic statistical 
model of the pattern of winning margins one should expect 
under the no-point-shaving null hypothesis. The model 
developed in this chapter provides a more formal benchmark 
of the patterns that should occur under the no-point-shaving 
null hypothesis with the goal of making more accurate infer-
ence about the true prevalence of point shaving.
Measuring corruption is an inherently difficult task 
because law-breakers cover their tracks. For that reason, 
empirical studies in forensic economics typically develop 
indirect tests for the presence of corruption. These tests look 
for behavior that is a rational response to incentives that only 
those who engage in the particular corrupt behavior face. 
The validity of these indirect tests depends critically on the 
assumption that similar patterns do not occur if agents only 
respond to the incentives generated by the institutions that 
govern noncorrupt behavior.
Wolfers (2006) considers the prevalence of illegal gam-
bling–related point shaving in college basketball games. The 
research design adopted by Wolfers begins with the assump-
tion that that the distribution of winning margins is sym-
metric under the null hypothesis of no point shaving. Point 
shaving occurs when a player exerts less than full effort 
so that his team will not “cover’’ the point spread (while 
presumably still attempting to win outright). Wolfers shows 
that point shaving introduces a right skewness in the distri-
bution of winning margins for favored teams, and under the 
assumption that winning margins are symmetrically distrib-
uted under the null the prevalence of point shaving may be 
inferred from the extent of skewness in the empirical win-
ning margin distribution. This skewness-based test for point 
shaving finds evidence that the intent to shave points was 
present in about 6 percent of games in which the point spread 
is above 12. Wolfers’ study garnered significant attention in 
the popular media, reflecting public surprise that corruption 
might be so pervasive in amateur athletics.
This chapter develops a structural model of basketball 
teams’ search for scoring opportunities in order to better 
understand the scoring patterns that follow from optimal but 
noncorrupt competition. In the model, teams take turns as 
the offensive side searching for scoring opportunities. The 
offensive side faces a sequence of arriving shot opportuni-
ties, which vary stochastically in quality. As in actual NCAA 
basketball games, the offensive side has 35 seconds to 
attempt a shot before the opponent is automatically awarded 
the ball. Like a worker in a job-search model, the searching 
team compares each arriving opportunity with the value of 
continued search. Because of the fixed horizon, the optimal 
strategy within a possession is a declining reservation policy 
where initially only the most advantageous opportunities 
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are accepted and less advantageous opportunities become 
acceptable as time goes by.
The optimal reservation policy depends on the current 
relative score and the time remaining in the game. Especially 
near the end of the game, a trailing team prefers to hurry by 
taking short possessions, and the leading team prefers to stall 
by taking long possessions. The direction of skewness in 
the distribution of winning margins depends on whether the 
opportunity cost curve associated with strategic adjustments 
(measured in foregone expected points per possession) is 
steeper when a team adopts a stalling strategy or a hurrying 
strategy. The parameters of the search process determine the 
opportunity cost of both stalling and hurrying. Skewness 
in either direction is possible in principle, so the direction 
of any bias in Wolfers’ (2006) test is itself an empirical 
question.
I derive and implement a maximum likelihood estimator 
of the model’s structural search parameters, and I apply the 
estimator to a data set containing point-spread records and 
possession-level play-by-play data from the first halves of 
5,258 college basketball games played from 2003 to 2008. 
The estimated parameters find that in the actual basketball 
scoring environment, the marginal cost curve associated with 
hurrying is steeper than the marginal cost curve associated 
with stalling. This relationship between the slopes of the two 
opportunity cost curves suggests that optimal strategies will 
cause the distribution of strong favorites’ winning margins 
to be right skewed, causing the skewness-based test for point 
shaving to overstate the true prevalence of point shaving.
To quantify the magnitude of the skewness that follows 
from optimal noncorrupt competition, I use the estimated 
model to simulate play during the second halves of games. 
I find that optimal noncorrupt strategic adjustments gener-
ate skewness patterns that are statistically indistinguish-
able from the patterns previously attributed to widespread 
point shaving. While we know from historical accounts of 
point-shaving scandals (Porter 2002; Rosen 2001) that the 
true prevalence of point shaving is not zero, I conclude that 
point shaving is substantially less prevalent than was thought 
based on the skewness-based test.
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